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DURKHEIM'S CULT
OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS CIVIL
RELIGION: ITS APPROPRIATION
BY ERVING GOFFMAN
JAMES J. CHRISS
University of Pennsylvania

The purpose of this article is to provide a systematic analysis of
the place of Durkheim's "cult of the individual" in Erving Goffman's
sOciology. 1 I have reviewed the most pertinent aspects of Durkheim's
sociology of religion. This article discusses and/or analyzes the development of the cult of the individual primarily within the context
of Durkheim's (1951) monograph on suicide; Durkheim's notions of
sacred, profane, and ritual; Goffman's two-pronged intellectual heritage; and Goffman's "Communication Conduct in an Island Community" (1953) with respect to several key Durkheimian concepts. Also
discussed are several important secondary analyses-primarily those
of' jurgen Habermas and Stanford Lyman-which help to further delineate the conditions of the Durkheim-Goffman link. The final section applies Goffman's sociology to the case of Evangelicalism and
"political civility."

DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
Emile Durkheim's sociology was thoroughly imbued with
concerns over religion and its role in societal change. As
Pearce (1989) has noted, Durkheim argued-especially in his
major treatise on religion, The Elementary Forms of the ReliA version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Society for
the SCientific Study of Religion, Pittsburgh, PA, November 1991. I thank Teresa Labov,
Bruce Wearne, Arthur Greil, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments
on several earlier drafts.
1As will be discussed more fully below, the phrase "cult of the individual"
refers to Durkheim's view of societal progression and the concomitant shift of em·
phasis toward the sanctity of the individual. There has been some terminological
confusion surrounding this general concept, however: besides "cult of the individ·
ual" or "individualism;' a number of other phrases have been used nearly interchangeably by a variety of translators (and even by Durkheim himself), e.g., "religion
of humanity;' "dignity of the human person;' "cult of personality;' and "cult of man"
{for an excellent discussion of these and related terminological matters, see Pickering
(19M, pp. 481-487]). For the sake of uniformity, then, I will, for the most part, follow
Marske's (1987) usage of "cult of the individual:'

gious Life-that everything social begins with religion, and that
there is no known society that does not possess or exhibit
some form of religion.
Durkheim (1938, 1951, 1954, 1984) was fascinated with the
power of religion and religious ideals in shaping the lives of a
community of believers. His now-famous distinction between
preliterate and advancing or modern societies hinged upon a
formulation that posited very different forms of solidarity corresponding with their respective species of SOciety. That is to
say, pre literate societies are dominated by a mechanical solidarity whose source is homogeneity, conformity of its members
through harsh and repressive sanctions (i.e., penal law), and a
collective consciousness that completely envelops and subordinates the individual to the society. In contrast, organic solidarity represents a form of moral development wherein solidarity is forged through heterogeneity, interdependence of
societal members, a shift toward restitutive law, and the emergence of the division of labor.
As one might expect, the role of religion in these societies
corresponds with the nature of social solidarity vis-a-vis this
mechanical-to-organic progression. As stated above, although
Durkheim was concerned with, and even somewhat in awe of,
religion, he felt that traditional religion was on the wane and
would not persist in Europe. In fact, Durkheim (1954, p. 475)
once said that " . .. the old gods are growing old or already
dead, and others are not yet born:'
But we immediately sense a paradox in Durkheim's sociologyof religion. On the one hand, Durkheim says that everything begins with religion and that it will always be a component of social life. On the other hand, however, he sees the
force of religion slowly waning and a general trend of secularization emerging as societies move toward organic solidarity.
How can these seemingly disparate positions in Durkheim's
thought be reconciled?
Durkheim's attempt to account for the twin phenomena
of ongOing secularization in light of the staying power of religion as a primordial force in modern society is at heart the
problem of " man and society" and the nature of individualism.
Rather than doing away with religion or suggesting that it
would soon become an analytically inconsequential category,
Durkheim merely shifted the quiddity of the religious force

from societal representation (as per mechanical solidarity) to
the sanctity of the individual (as per organic solidarity). This is
most clearly illustrated in the progression of Durkheim's
thought beginning in his monograph on suicide (Durkheim
1951) and extending through his last great work, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1954).

SUICIDE
let us turn to one passage in particular from Suicide (1951,
p. 341) that stands out as a seemingly exemplary instance of
Durkheim's functionalism:
Suicide is, then, a transformed and attenuated homicide... ,
It would even seem that one should not try to restrain its
scope by prohibitive measures .... It is a safety-valve which
is useful to leave open. In short, suicide would have the very
great advantage of ridding us of a number of useless or
harmful persons without social intervention, and hence in
the most simple and economical way. Is it not better to let
them put themselves out of the way voluntarily and quietly,
than to force society to eject them from its midst by violence?

Now anyone who has given Suicide a thorough and thoughtful
reading should recognize instantly that the naive functionalism
evident in the above quote is merely rhetorical. In point of fact,
Durkheim goes on to argue against such notions as these.
However, at least one strand of thought from the quote
seems in line with what Durkheim has been theorizing in more
general terms, namely his notion that as social solidarity progresses from mechanical to organic the society's laws tend to
transform from harsh and repressive to more lenient and restitutive. According to this line of thinking, one might expect
Durkheim to suggest in Suicide that prohibitive measures
against suicide should wane as a society becomes more modern. But this, in fact, is not the case. Rather, Durkheim is careful
to construct an argument against the notion that condemnation against suicide lessens as societies advance. After dedicating the first parts of the book to the verification that suicide is
indeed a social, rather than a psychological, phenomenon,

Durkheim approaches this question by asking, to what degree
should suicide be considered a criminal act?
To answer this, Durkheim takes a brief historical digression, a retreat through time to compare how different societies
and ages have viewed suicide. Durkheim's (1951, p. 326) strategy, then, is to discover " . .. how peoples actually have estimated suicide morally in the course of history; then try to find
the reasons for this estimate:' He (1951, p. 327) begins with the
assessment that lias soon as Christian societies were formed,
suicide was formally forbidden in them:' From 452 A.D. in the
council of Aries to Prague in 563 and on through to the throne
of louis XIV in 1670, Durkheim traces the record of each society's moral and legal sanctionings against suicide. As might be
expected, Durkheim finds a general trend: with the progression of time there has been a concomitant change from repressive, barbaric punishment against suicide or its attempt toward, if not decriminalization, at least the lessening of the
penalty. Thus, for example, Durkheim (1951, p. 329) shows that
according to the 1881 New York penal code suicide was still
listed as a crime, but "in spite of this, punishment has been
given up for practical reasons, since the penalty could in no
way affect the guilty person:'
What Durkheim (1951, p. 332) is leading to here is that,
beyond the primitive stage, legislation concerning suicide falls
into two broad categories. First, in earlier societies (specifically
the Greco-latin city-states) the state stands in complete domination over the individual: " . ..the individual is forbidden to
destroy himself on his own authority; but the State may permit
him to do so:' Since the collective conscience is still strong
here, the individual who takes his or her own life is in effect
transgressing against the state for not collaborating beforehand with the "organs of life:'
In the second, more modern period-with the emergence
of organic solidarity-Durkheim (1951, p. 333) suggests that
"condemnation [against suicide] is absolute and universal:' In
this new morality not even the state has the right or privilege to
take (or allow the taking of) a life. With the progression of morality, of organic solidarity, suicide is now viewed as an immoral
act in and of itself. Thus, in answer to his own rhetorical query
posed earlier, Durkheim responds by saying that "with the progression of history the prohibition [against suicide] becomes

more strict:' It is by this presentation of the historical record
that Durkheim shows how moral evolution affects and directs a
society's legislation against suicide.
Durkheim describes this trend toward greater condemnation of suicide as resulting from the change of focus in modern
society away from the state and more toward the human personality. The human personality has, in effect, become sacred,
and it is exalted to a level even above and beyond that of society itself. Whereas before the state had rights over the individual in terms of allowing a suicide, today the dignity of the self
transcends all, including that of the individual. Durkheim (1951,
pp. 333-334) explains this seemingly paradoxical statement as
follows:
But today [the individual] has acquired a kind of dignity
which places him above himself as well as above society. So
long as his conduct has not caused him to forfeit the title of
man, he seems to us to share in some degree that quality sui
generis ascribed by every religion to its gods which renders
them inviolable by everything mortal.

Thus, according to Durkheim, the individual-that storehouse of the human personality-becomes sacrosanct. Men
and women now, as a result of the division of labor and the
onset of organic solidarity, worship each other's quality of "otherness:' The taking of one's own life is no longer simply a
transgression against the state; it is now the ultimate sacrilege.
Morality rests within the very otherness of the other and of
ourselves; the "cult of human personality" is the new, modernday object of worship. To strike against it by committing suicide is to strike against the very heart and soul of humanity.
Durkheim makes, in my own estimation, a compelling
case for the move toward a greater emphasis on the sacred
nature of the individual. There seems little evidence to deny
his suggestion that beginning in antiquity-in the original state
of affairS-SOciety is viewed as everything while the individual
is nothing. Things are done for society's sake; individuals are
simply means for achieving society's ultimate ends or purposes. But over time, as he has shown, the face of society
changes; the very nature of morality itself goes through a metamorphosis, growing from infancy to adulthood. It is at this
point where Durkheim really begins to pull it all together thea-

retically, where he begins to incorporate in a very meaningful
way the important strands of thought from his earlier work in
Division of Labor. It is a passage worth quoting in its entirety.
As Durkheim (1951, p. 336) explains:
But gradually things change. As societies become greater in
volume and density, they increase in complexity, work is divided, individual differences multiply, and the moment approaches when the only remaining bond among the members of a single human group will be that they are all men.
Under such conditions the body of collective sentiments inevitably attaches itself with all its strength to its single remaining object, communicating to this object an incomparable value by so doing. Since human personality is the only
thing that appeals unanimously to all hearts, since its enhancement is the only aim that can be collectively pursued,
it inevitably acquires exceptional value in the eyes of all. It
thus rises far above all human aims, assuming a religious
nature.

Thus the cult of the individual comes to full fruition. 2 This new
religion of man is not an egoistical, individualistic celebration
of human qua human (a la standard utilitarianism), it is, rather,
this notion of a shared moral community. It is the realization
that the human personality ordains within each of us a moral
dignity that transcends and goes beyond the claims of any person or thing, including the state. But at the same time the essence of this morality-this ideal that subordinates us all to the
general interests of humanity but that simultaneously draws
each of us beyond ourselves as well-is not possessible within
us as individuals; rather it is an essence set apart, sui generis.
As Durkheim (1951, p. 33n explains, "Our dignity as moral be-ings is therefore no longer the property of the city-state; but it
has not for that reason become our property, and we have not
acquired the right to do what we wish with it. How
2Although I draw primarily from Suicide in tracing the development of the cult
of the individual, one should note that Durkheim was involved in similar discussions
in Professional EthICS and CivIC Morals (1957, pp. 69-72) and Moral EducatIon (1961,
pp. 6-12). For excellent summaries of these latter treatments see, respectively, Lukes
(1972, pp. 268-274) and Mestrovic (1988, pp. 134-140). Finally, Marske (1987) provides
perhaps the most extensive discussion of the progression of Durkheim's thought on
moral individualism.

couid we have such a right if society, the existence greater than
ourselves, does not have it?" Hence, Durkheim shows that suicide is indeed an immoral act because no one has the right to
deny oneself this religion of man.

THE SACRED, THE PROFANE,
AND RITUAL
One of Durkheim's (1954) best-known distinctions is that
of sacred versus profane. All societies employ symbols that are
externalized vehicles for the representation of intersubjective
feelings and collective sentiment. Symbols perpetuate the social order, and the songs we sing, the prayers we pray, the
national anthems that stir us to rise in unison, even the particular or secret handshake of a special group-all these reinforce
the social solidarity (TIryakian 1978, p. 220).
The most compelling sentiment for Durkheim (1954) in
providing the foundation of group identity is the religious sentiment, i.e., the feelings of the sacred. Human cultures (or belief systems) tend to divide the world and lead individuals to
perceive and experience two categories: 1) the sacred-toward
sacred entities we take an affective or expressive orientation
that views these objects as ends in themselves (e.g., totems); 2)
the profane-those things and attitudes characteristic of the
economic, rather than the religious, life. Profane objects elicit
instrumental and/or utilitarian orientations; they are means toward some further goal. Economic life is dull, monotonous,
and "generally of a very mediocre intensity" (Durkheim 1954,
p. 247). The understanding of society and the beliefs and meanings that group members hold as collective representations of
that society reside in the religious life. Beyond the rational calculations of economic life, the partaking of ritual in collective
ceremonies and other dramatic occasions binds societal members together in a form of solidarity that is affective, marked by
periods of festivity and enthusiasm.
Ritual, then, is the mechanism by which members partaking of the religious life recreate the crescendo of collective
sentiment forged around the symbolic understanding of mana,
or the soul. Humans have always (but especially so in modern
times) felt the urge to transcend the conditions of the mundane world of the economic life toward the extraordinary

world of the sacred, because it is in these times of collective
stimulation through ritual that primordial and ultimate understandings of being in the world are obtainable. liryakian (1978,
p. 220) is correct, I believe, when he stated that Durkheim's
(1954) analysis, although concentrating on primitive tribes and
their relation to the sacred, is relevant to the case of modern
society. It is especially relevant in the case of Goffman's sociology.

GOFFMAN'S INTELLECTUAL LINEAGE
There are two strands of thought undergirding Erving
Goffman's sociology.3 One of these is the senior line of phenomenological scholarship that MacCannell (1983, p. 11) has
described as "the Husserl-Heidegger-Sartre-Goffman succession:' This particular strand of phenomenology (as opposed to
the Schutz-Berger and Luckman variety) attempts to describe
the nature of intersubjective understanding in the realm of the
everyday and mundane. Current phenomenological sociology
as seminally derived from Husserl has progressed through a
variety of stages, most importantly "existentialism" in the form
of, e.g., Heidegger and Sartre, and "deconstruction ism" by way
of, e.g., Merleau-Ponty and Laing (as well as various other
forms of revision and update, e.g., Vaitkus [1991]). These revisions and critiques of the original Husserlian project appear in
Goffman's work in the guise of, e.g., "frames" and "multiple
realities" (1974, 1979, 1981), "signs" and "being-with" (1961b,
1971), the structure and phenomenon of the social "self" (1959,
1961a, 1963a), and intersubjective understanding of the other,
be it via either the everyday and mundane (e.g., the practical or
fiduciary attitude), or manipulated and "strategic" interaction
(1963b, 1969, 1971).
The second of Goffman's intellectual lineages, and the
one with which this study is primarily concerned, hails from
British social anthropology and, of course, the work of Emile
3More to the pOint, these are the two major strands of Goffman's thought that,
I emphasize, are most important in understanding his view of the individual and
morality in modern society. There are other influences, of course; in several recent
statements, Burns (1992) and Stein (1991) illustrate how Durkheim, Simmel, the Chicago School, animal ethology, and linguistic philosophy all contributed in important
ways to Goffman's oeuvre.

Durkheim (Collins 1986, 1988; MacCannell 1990). Although receiving his Ph.D. in sociology from Chicago, Goffman nevertheless eschewed the training in symbolic interactionism for
which that department was famous. Hence, instead of Blumer
or Mead, Goffman chose to study under the anthropologist/sociologist Lloyd Warner, himself heavily influenced by Durkheim
(Collins 1980, 1986; Hannerz 1980).
Although the two intellectual lines as discussed above are
readily evident and distinct, I argue that Durkheim's notion of
ritual played the greatest part in informin Goffman's theories
concerning social interaction and order. Goffman's formulation of social action secularizes religious morality by exhibiting
how individuals are imbued with a variety of competencies at
the level of the interaction order, thereby following Durkheim's
own theories of the shift toward an increasing sanctification of
the individual.
It should also be stated that, although distinct, the two
strands of Goffman's thought-phenomenological-existential
and SOciological-are not necessarily antithetical. Edward Tiryakian (1961) has argued, for example, that although "existentialism" and IIsociologism" are different approaches to the
question of "the individual and society:' the two have successfully been brought together by Emile Durkheim. It is suggested
that Goffman has indeed reconciled these two approaches in
his theory by embracing, again, the Durkheimian formulation
of ritual.

p

DURKHEIM AND GOFFMAN: A BEGINNING
I begin this section with a discussion of Goffman's (1953)
dissertation, because it is here that some important insights are
afforded with respect to both Goffman's relation to the
thought of Emile Durkheim and his attempt to explicate the
4Although the argument of a Durkheim-Goffman link is certainly not new or
novel (see, e.g., Collins 1975, 1980; Collins and Makowsky 1972; Miller 1982; Mitchell
1978), I intend to clarify and update the argument along several dimensions. One,
beginning in this and extending into follOWing sections I shall present certain key
passages from Goffman that, although largely neglected, nevertheless provide important new glimpses into the Durkheimian core. Two, I shall attempt to pull together
the loose strands of Goffman's thought (as alluded to above and as discussed in, e.g.,
Alexander 1987; Giddens 1981, 1988; and Williams 1988) through an interpretive matrix informed primarily by Jurgen Habermas and Stanford Lyman.

nature of morality, especially within the realm of face-to-face
interaction.
The crucial passage is contained within Goffman's discussion of "sign situations:' that is, the unique array of information relaying, processing, monitoring, and control that emerges
whenever persons enter into each other's immediate presence.
The initial evaluations by each actor of the other's appearance,
gestures, countenance, demeanor, and so forth provide a provisional definition of the situation. Within the context of this
process of discovery and negotiation, however, Goffman (1953,
p. 103) further suggests that
For the actor, others may come to be seen as sacred objects.
The social attributes of recipients must be constantly honored; where these attributes have been dishonored, propitiation must follow .... [The actor] must conduct himself with
great ritual care, threading his way through one situation,
avoiding another, counteracting a third, lest he unintentionally and unwittingly convey a judgment of those present that
is offensive to them.
This is the beginning of Goffman's use of Durkheimian imagery.
Notice next Goffman's less than subtle jab at Mead and
Weber, both of whom he accuses of placing an undue stress
upon the instrumental or rational dimension of social action.
This misguided view of action has, according to Goffman,
caused these and other theorists to completely overlookindeed, even be blinded to-the actual moral fiber finely entwined in the rituals of face-to-face interaction. As Goffman
(ibid.) explains,
The ritual model for social interaction has been poorly
treated in the literature, perhaps because of the stress given
by G. H. Mead and by Weber to the fact that a social relationship, and hence social interaction, was a product of two
persons taking each other's actions into consideration in
pursuing their own actions. This stress seems to have given
an instrumental flavor to our thinking about the kinds of
consideration we show in regard to others: the implication
is that we take into consideration the actions of others <the
better to achieve our personal ends, whatever these may be)
and not so much that we give consideration to other per-

sons. By "consideration" we have tended to mean calculation, not considerateness.

Goffman (1953, p. 104) continues in this same vein, citing along
the way Durkheim's Elementary Forms of the Religious Life as
providing the basis upon which this aspect of his dramaturgical
theory has been forged:
A case may be made for the view that the best model for an
object to which we give consideration is not a person at all,
but a sacred idol, image or god. It is to such sacred objects
that we show in extreme what we show to persons. We feel
that these objects possess some sacred value, whether positive and purifying, or negative and polluting, and we feel
disposed to perform rites before these objects. These rites
we perform as frequently and compulsively as the sacred
value of the object is great. These worshipful acts express
our adoration, or fear, or hate, and serve for the idol as periodic assurances that we are keeping faith and deserve to be
in its favor. When in the idol's immediate presence we act
with ritual care, appreciating that pious actions may favorably dispose the idol toward us and that impious actions
may anger the idol and cause it to perform angry actions
against us. Persons, unless they are of high office, do not
have as much sacred power or mana as do idols, and hence
need not be treated with as much ceremony. An idol is to a
person as a rite is to etiquette.

This last sentence is quite telling, because it helps explain
Goffman's lifelong fascination with rules of etiquette, norms of
politeness, access rituals, face engagements, territories of the
self, body gloss, personal fronts, deference and demeanor, and
on down the line. Also, those who are uncomfortable with
what might be perceived as an overly optimistic or overextended analogy-that is, face-to-face interaction as a secularized form of religious ritual-can take comfort in Goffman's
own clarification of the extent to which he is willing to carry it.
"An idol is to a person as a rite is to etiquette" is an important
part of understanding both how Goffman himself understands
Durkheim and how in modern, secular society we continue to
witness persons orienting themselves-for whatever reasontoward a perceived moral universe.
Next, a slight digression will be offered in the following
two sections, one that retraces the Durkheim-to-Goffman link

through a variety of important interpretations, the purpose of
which is to tie together the loose strands of Goffman's intellectual lineage mentioned in the previous section.

FROM DURKHEIM TO MEAD
I spoke earlier of the two major components of Goffman's
thought, namely the phenomenological and the sociological. It
was suggested that Durkheim's sociology affords a bridge between these two formulations, the phenomenological or existential representing the "man" or "individual" (i.e., micro), and
the sociological representing the "society" (i.e., macro) aspect
of the problem. With this in mind we may now turn briefly to a
related set of concerns with which Jurgen Habermas has dealt.
In a brilliant piece of theoretical synthesis, Habermas
(1987) has made explicit much of what is implicit or embedded
in Goffman, this by providing a bridge between Durkheim and
s
Mead. We have already seen in Durkheim that religion is the
outward manifestation of the collective consciousness. These
ritual gatherings that reflect solidarity and group belief were
observed as well by Mead in his theory of the development of
personality. As Mead (1962) states, "It is where the 'I' and 'me'
can in some sense fuse that there arises the peculiar sense of
exaltation which belongs to the religious and patriotic attitudes
in which the reaction which one calls out in others is the response which one is making himself:'
Habermas (1987) thus suggests that both Mead and
Durkheim were concerned with the Iinguistification of the sacred. First, Mead's theory of the development of the personality implicitly views religious symbolism as the archaic core of
norm consciousness, because the move toward conceptualizSHabermas (1984) accuses Goffman's dramaturgical theory of action of being
one-sided in its emphasis on the strategic and goal-oriented nature of actors' selfpresentations. However, Habermas (1987, p. 46) also argues that Durkheim's notion of
the collective consciousness is helpful for his own theoretical program insofar as it
represents for Habermas a prelinguistic root of communicative action. So even
though Habermas is overtly critical of Goffman, his discussion of Durkheim and the
ontogenesis of ritual unwittingly reveals a positive relation between Durkheim and
Goffman for which I am here attempting to argue. The relation between Habermas
and Goffman-especially as mediated through Durkheim-is complex and cannot be
pursued further here. For a very brief statement of the "Habermas-Goffman" problem, see Chriss (1992).

ing the generalized other (through which the personality and
the individual is forged) occurs only through and upon the
acquisition of complex language or linguistic codes. Second,
Durkheim's theory of societal progression emphasizes the
scientization or rationalization of worldviews and the concomitant diminution of the religious force (Pickering 1984, p. 482).
For Durkheim, rationalized codes of conduct such as the (explicit) rise of civil, restitutive law and the (implicit) cult of the
individual exemplify the nature of modern society. With regard
to both Mead and Durkheim, then, Habermas (1987, p. 46)
states that liTo the degree that the rationality potential ingrained in communicative action is released, the archaic core
of the normative dissolves and gives way to the rationalization
of worldviews, to the universalization of law and morality, and
to the acceleration of processes of individuation. 6

FROM MEAD TO GOFFMAN
The full implications of Mead's and Durkheim's views of
ritual and the linguistification of the sacred will come to light
only after completing another crucial progression of thought,
this time from Mead to Goffman. For this I draw primarily from
the works of Stanford lyman (1990, 1991; Vidich and lyman
1985).
lyman's general theme is that the enlightenment ethos that
resonates through the writings of those philosophers and social
theorists being discussed here led each to a worldly rejection of
religion. Our problem can be seen then as a double hermeneutic (Giddens 1979) or what Goffman (1974) has referred to as a
frame within a frame: 1} social scientists struggling to understand and explain what is theorized to be a generalized and
inexorable process, namely the secularization of society; and 2)
caught up as they were in the spirit and ethos of their time,
these same theorists felt the effects of the hypothesized rationalization of worldviews, the universalization of morality, etc., re6/t is suggested that this rationalization of worldviews is a concomitant of
Durkheim's theory of societal progreSSion, namely, the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity. The cult of the individual is seen as ariSing through the prism of the
division of labor and the continuing differentiation of tasks, thereby producing a new
form of morality that is itself based upon the heightened interdependence of societal
members.

cursively in their own writings-this of course amounting to the
worldly rejection of religion as a lived conviction.
Without going into great detail we could, following Vidich
and lyman (1985, p. 267), say that the intellectual lineage from
Josiah Royce and Durkheim through Mead, Blumer, and finally
Goffman illustrates that lithe binding covenant of the [earlier]
Protestant ethicists erodes in the face of the emergence of a
plurality of worldly, nonbinding situational and personal ethics:' Hence, for example, in place of Durkheim's collective conscience or community of individuals there is now polysymbolic
interpretation (Vaitkus 1991) and unanchored selves, i.e., the
cult of the individual. 7
If we can agree with Harry Johnson (1979, p. 313) that religion is "a kind of code, model or paradigm that shapes or patterns a more or less 'total' way of life: inner experience, action,
and judgment:' we see that each of our theorists was led to ask
the same question: if in fact the religious force is on the wane,
what is or will be the moral basis of an enlightenment society?
Vidich and lyman (1985, p. 268) suggest that although they
are all committed to some form of secularized (i.e., rationalized) thought, neither Royce's retreat into Pauline communitarian ism nor Mead's collective will of the generalized other, nor
even Blumer's conception of a secular ethics of the public interest are able to establish the kind of moral basis upon which
societal members could orient their actions. This is because of
the overly individualistic nature of the solution to the problem
of how and by what process the individual becomes free from
religious control toward the ultimate privatization of religion.
In other words, as Habermas's (1987) Iinguistification of the sacred suggests, there must be some outwardly visible, binding
ethos or morality-the total way of life once provided by
religion-by which societal members could guide their actions.
Goffman's solution is to place the externalization of the
moral code directly onto the structure of face-to-face interaction itself, thereby overcoming the theoretical complications
arising from attempts to explicate or represent psychological
processes of norm internalization. In one of his earlier papers,
7This idea of "unanchored selves" should not, however, be equated with unhealthy egoism, but rather should be seen as running closer to the spirit of the type
of healthy individualism espoused by Durkheim.

liThe Nature of Deference and Demeanor:' Goffman (1967, p.
47) outlines this approach and makes explicit his connection to
Durkheim:
In this paper I want to explore some of the senses in which
the person in our urban secular world is allotted a kind of
sacredness that is displayed and confirmed by symbolic
acts.... Through these reformulations I will try to show that
a version of Durkheim's social psychology can be effective
in modern dress.

What Goffman has hit upon is the rather straightforward
notion that all societies have rules of conduct that are organized into codes by which individuals are or become aware of
what types of acts are appropriate or inappropriate in whichever type of social setting. Whether ceremonial or substantive,
these messages carried in acts or events say something about
the degree to which individuals in the group understand or
show appreciation for the nature of the gathering.
Durkheim (e.g., 1938, 1951, 1984) has shown that in preliterate societies the nature of individual action is constrained to
the extent that it is relegated to a sort of mechanical acquiescence to the group. As stated earlier, this type of mechanical
solidarity, oftentimes instantiated in religious ceremony or ritual, ensures that specific, sanctioned forms of conduct will
emerge. At this stage-the mechanical form of solidarity-there
is no conception of the individual, as even slight variations
from the group norm can bring quick and harsh reprobation.
Durkheim's (1984) sociology of law emerged from his observations concerning the extent to which societal laws tend to
be either repressive or restitutive. A premodern society with its
concomitant form of mechanical solidarity would be characterized by (if any) punitive laws, whereas modern society with its
organic solidarity would be characterized by restitutive law.
Goffman (1967, p. 90) of course realizes this as well, stating
that liThe rules of conduct which bind the actor and the recipient together are the bindings of society:' His work thereby reveals what lies at the intersection of the sociology of religion
and the sociology of law (lyman 1990, 1991). Following from
Durkheim's theory of the progression of society, Goffman depicts a social action predicated on the notion of a civil religion
whose outward manifestations are the tacit set of rules and

conventions-the rituals, if you will-guiding the course of
face-to-face interaction. But unlike Mead's generalized other,
Goffman's civil religion emphasizes that individuals are driven
into self-presentation and -promotion. Society thereby has become primarily a species of communicative conduct wherein
"each member presents what he hopes are efficacious excuses
or justifications for acts called into question" (Vidich and lyman 1985, p. 306; d. Habermas 1987).
As we see, then, Durkheim and Goffman were both ultimately concerned with describing the conditions of social order, Durkheim at the macro level and Goffman, the micro
8
Ieve 1. Goffman's expansive illumination of categories and typologies of the various ways societal members navigate the
conditions of the interaction order-through the revealing or
concealing of secrets; the commitment, attachment, embracement, or role-distance to or from social or cultural objects; the
handling of personal and use space; access rituals; accounts,
apologies, remedial and supportive interchanges, face work;
frames, fabrications, keyings; and through various forms of talk
and the gestural and expressive signifiers that obtain-attests
to the array of social tools available to individuals by which
each may indicate the degree to which they are competent and
9
willing to partake in the living of group life.
8MacCanneil (1990) has made much the same pOint, arguing that Goffman's
appropriation of Durkheim can be seen as the continuing attempt to delineate the
external or visible (i.e., nonpsychological) factors-here being the interpersonal rituals of the interaction order-that operate in binding individuals to a moral code in
the face of ongoing secularization. For a similar analysis of how ritual provides a link
between the macro and micro, see Miller (1982).
9'fhe point is that GoHman, like Durkheim, suggests that the individual has
become the principal sacred object in secular society. The self, however, is not negotiated as in Mead or Blumer; rather, " ... it is the archetypal modern myth. We are compelled to have an individual self not because we actually have one but because social
interaction requires us to act as if we do" (Collins 1986, p. 107). See also Hannerz
(1980), Berger (1973), and MacCannell (1990), each of whom discusses the appropriation by GoHman of Durkheim's notion of mana (soul). As the soul of the human being
has become the focus of modern society, it IS worshipped and considered worthy of
awe as expressed through and by ritual attention. As Hannerz (1980, p. 210) explains,
"People worship each other as little gods, in countless almost imperceptible ways;
they become noticeable only In their absence, when the proper rituals are not performed and when the treatment given instead is seen as symbolic violence. The
expression of acceptance of presented selves, at least within limits, thus becomes
part of htu rgy:'

The rituals in which members engage attest also to the
sanctity of the individual, for each strip of action, though carried out on an individual basis, nevertheless conveys the collective nature of group life. As Goffman (1967, p. 42) has stated,
"The ritual order seems to be organized basically on accommodative lines"; and further, by acquiring this ability to accommodate others "the person becomes a kind of construct, built up
not from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that
are impressed upon him from without" (Goffman 1967, p. 45).
This accommodative function of the ritual order is especially salient with respect to Goffman's (1971) discussion of
"maintenance rites," These are planned, repetitive gatherings
that celebrate or reinforce contact between persons, thereby in
turn serving symbolically to "guarantee the well-being of the
relationship" (Goffman 1971, p. 73). Cheal (1988, pp. 98, 102,
106) has suggested that "rites of progression" (e.g., wedding
anniversaries, birthdays, Mother's Day rituals) are concrete examples of the concepts we are here attempting to link:
Goffman's maintenance rites and Durkheim's (1984, p. 122)
"dignity of the human person" or, equivalently, "cult of the
individual:'

AN APPLICATION: EVANGELICALISM
AND THE ETHIC OF CIVILITY
Goffman's ideas concerning the accommodative function
of the ritual order correspond as well with the concept of civil
religion (e.g., Bellah 1964, 1967, 1970; Cuddihy 1978; Parsons
1978; Parsons and Platt 1973) and may be fruitfully applied to
the case of Evangelicalism and "political civility" (Hunter 1983,
1984, 1987).10 Cladis (1992, p. 76) sets the stage by explaining
that
In an age marked by increased individualism and the eclipse
of many traditional communities and social practices,
Durkheim fears that the benefits of liberalism could be out10Both Parsons's "institutionalized individualism" and Bellah's "civil religion"
are derived from Durkheim's cult of the individual, and for this reason share certain
affinities with Goffman's ritual and interaction orders, namely the rejection of the
utilitarian tradition that ViewS the social actor from an individualistic and hyperrationalistic perspective (Tseelon 1992).

weighed by its deleterious byproducts. He reminds us that
when we inhabit the modern world (or worlds) we still receive many shared truths and goals. We live in a public
world, a world not simply of our own, private making.
Durkheim attempts to expose and strengthen those ties that
join us to each other and to a common past and shared
future. The rights and dignity of the individual are perhaps
the most salient feature of our solidarity in modern democratic nations. Yet these are accompanied by various social
commitments and obligations, and they need to be situated
in a shared, moral context (call it democratic republicanism),
lest they promote egoism instead of what Durkheim calls
moral individualism, a common set of liberal dispositions
and virtues.

As Hunter (1984, p. 364) has pointed out, virtually all of the
world's religions manifest to some degree a radical wing of
belief that, because it is so strongly committed to the doctrines
and teachings of that particular religion, is apt to push its ad11
herents toward engaging in aggressive political action. This
phenomenon is certainly visible in the United States with regard to the political activities of certain factions within conservative Protestantism or Evangelicalism (such as the New Christian Right and the Moral Majority). Much of the political activity
of the evangelicals, especially with regard to their attempts to
mobilize support and affect legislation against such issues as
the ERA, homosexuality, school prayer, and abortion (Hunter
1987), has led to the accusation from some corners that this
group's "extremist policies and often violent political measures
[may indeed] undermine national democratic processes and
even international stability" (Hunter 1984, p. 364).
One of the great trends of modernism to which much of
Durkheim's attention was drawn, especially as seen in the
quote from Cladis above, has been the separation of church
and state and the more general private/public split (Durkheim
1974; Hall 1987). This emphasiS on the ethic of the separation
between church and state, between religion and politics, has
served to continually focus debate on the "proper" place of
religion in a modern, "civil" society (Hunter 1987, p. 151).
11( am indebted to an anonymous revIewer for bringing to my attention the
work of James Hunter.

Within the milieu of the civil society there exists as well a
strong ethic of toleration, in this case, the overt support of the
right of any group of worshipers to hold to their political, religious, or ideological beliefs, however "offensive" or distasteful
these may appear to the society at large. It is suggested, for
example, that sharp disagreement and open public debate on
such issues is a sign of a healthy and tolerant democratic environment (i.e., the instantiation of Cladis's "democratic republicanism").
The important thing to note here is that this ethic of tolerance entails not only a general tolerance of others, but even
more crucially in the case of Goffman's sociology, that individuals be tolerable to others (Hunter 1987, p. 152). Hence, as
Hunter (1987, p. 153) has reported, the "pugnacious" and "incivil" tactics of such groups as the Moral Majority, Operation
Rescue, and other evangelicals have become tempered somewhat in recent years by the simple realization that these
breachings of the norm of political civility have done little to
help their cause or endear themselves to the general public. 12
Consider how Goffmanesque this "ethic of civility" (Cuddihy 1978) appears in Hunter's (1987, p. 152) description of the
dilemmas faced by evangelicals in attempting to make public,
through perhaps even "incivil" means, their particular set of
religious and political beliefs:
This ethic [of civility] is an ethic of gentility and studied
moderation. It speaks of a code of social discourse whereby
religious beliefs and political convictions are to be expressed discreetely and tactfully and in most cases, privately.
Convictions are to be tempered by "good taste" and sensibility. It is an ethic which pleads "no offense!' The greatest
breach of these norms is belligerence and divisiveness; the
greatest atrocity is to be offensive and thus intolerable.

As we have already witnessed, Goffman, for much of his career,
was concerned with cataloguing the many ways in which persons manage impressions of themselves before a group of oth12ThiS phenomenon of accommodation IS also evident In the recent rise of
scientific creationism, a movement that attempts to debate the theory of evolution
and the creation not only from a theological perspective, but also from Within the
mere secular and humanist discourses of science (Eckberg 1992).

ers.13 These routines of everyday life, these ceremonial and
substantive rituals played out on the public and private stage
whereby persons exhibit through deference and demeanor the
obligations and expectations of their group or society, were for
Goffman the defining moment in the understanding of social
order in general (Stein 1991, p. 422). The rituals of face-to-face
conduct, especially as these involve the attempt to accommodate persons so as to avoid overt hostility and confrontation,
are the direct descendant of the type of moral and ethical
codes carried in Durkheim's cult of the individual or, alternately, respect for the human person.
For Goffman (1967, p. 45), the rituals of daily life themselves provide the basis upon which a moral career is established. He states that
The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well
belong to the individual, but the particular set of rules
which transforms him into a human being derives from requirements established in the ritual organization of social
encounters.
For this to work Goffman must bank heavily on Durkheim's
suggestion that through ritual individuals produce and reproduce moral sentiments. The affective or expressive components elicited as a result of the social gathering are tied symbolically to, or equated with, the ritual work itself, thereby
creating a form of sociation or consciousness that helps to perpetuate the moral code within each individual as a lived conviction. In this light Collins (1988, p. 46) argues that for Goffman
"Everyday life is a ritual: this is a direct extension of the Durkheimian argument. And the primary sacred object, elevated to
symbolic status by the way rituals are structured in everyday
Iife, is the self:'
In analyzing Goffman's sociology through Durkheim's cult
of the individual, then, I have attempted to deny the extent to
13As Burns (1992, p. 27) explains, Goffman's conception of the "interaction
order" amounts "to the recognition by people of an obligation to display what used
to be called 'civility' or 'good manners'-socially acceptable or 'proper' behaviour-in
the presence of others .... The highest common factor, so to speak, is no more than
the practice of behaving predictably, or refraining from causing offence to other
people, or not obstructing or interfermg with their presence, passage or utterance,
either actual or intended!'

which many writers have placed Goffman in the utilitarian or
individualistic camp <e.g., Alexander [1987] and Habermas
[1984], but d. Rawls [1987]). By illustrating his deep connections to Durkheim, I have shown how Goffman's interaction
order, built up as it is from the vast array of interpersonal rituals contained therein, serves as a continuation of Durkheim's
ideas concerning the sanctity of the individual and the progression of modern society. Both Durkheim and Goffman were
concerned with describing how modern individualism is
based, not so much on the strategic action of utilitarian social
philosophy, but, rather, on the sort of morality arising, nearly in
"sui generis" fashion (Rawls 1987), from the exigencies of faceto-face interaction and group life. In fact, Schoenfeld and Me5trovic's (1991, p. 84) defense of Durkheim, in this regard, can be
equally applied to Goffman: "In sum, Durkheim sought to depict a form of individualism that is far removed from utilitarian,
egoistic, self-interested depictions of the human person found
in most discourse on this topic:'
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